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ABSTRACT
The audit expectations gap is of serious concern to the UK accounting profession with the Department of  
Trade and Industry proposing a new framework for independent regulation of the accounting profession.2 
However the new Accounting Foundation has had its role placed under review  following the Enron collapse  
and introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.3 This resulted in responsibility for independent regulation 
of  the  accounting  profession  being  transferred to  the  reconstituted Financial  Reporting  Council.4 High 
profile  failure  of  financial  services  firms,  commencing with the  secondary banking crisis  in  the  1970s,  
followed by collapses of banks such as Johnson Matthey Bankers ( JMB), Bank of Credit and Commerce  
International  (BCCI)  and  Barings,  building  societies  such  as  Grays  and  insurers  such  as  the  recent  
problems  at  Equitable  Life  and  Independent  Insurance  have  given  rise  to  further  debate  on  the  audit  
expectations gap. The debate surrounding the “expectations gap” often revolves around whether such a gap  
can be eliminated.  Sikka,  Puxty, Cooper and Wilmott argue that within a social context, the expectations  
gap will be difficult to eliminate due to social conflict and the fact that the meaning of social practices is  
always subject to challenges.5  It will however,  be argued that even though the whole component definition 
of an audit may be subject to changes and challenges and therefore cannot be objective, elements within the  
definition of an audit and in particular, the fraud and error detection role of an audit can be relatively  
objective. 
A)  INTRODUCTION
The  Expectations  Gap
If a survey were carried out within the general public and members of the public were asked to give a “true” 
or  “false”  answer  to  the  statement  :  “The  role  of  the  auditor  is  to  detect  fraud  and  error  in  financial 
statements”,  most people would say true. In  Re Kingston  Cotton Mills ( No 2) [1896]6 ,  LJ Lopes of the 
Appeal Court  stated that the auditor was a watchdog but not a bloodhound.  This remark underlines the fact 
that the auditor's primary role is not the detection of fraud.  The probable lack of clarity between users of 
financial  statements,  the general  public and auditors as relating to the proper  definition of the role  and 
1 School of  Social Sciences  and Law.  Usual disclaimers apply.
2   P Dewing and P O Russell The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK Financial  
Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 3
3  Ibid pp 2-3
4  Ibid p 3
5   P Sikka  A Puxty H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003
6   Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co (No 2), [1896] 2 Ch 279 at 288, CA 
definition of an audit  is what contributes to the “expectations gap”. 
The “expectations  gap” is the difference  between what users of financial statements, the general public 
perceive an audit to be and what the audit  profession claim  is expected of them in conducting an audit.  In 
this respect, it is important to distinguish between the audit profession's expectations of an audit on one hand, 
and the auditor's perception of the audit on the other hand. Apart from users of financial statements and the 
general  public,  an auditor  may also perceive a   somewhat  different  interpretation or worse  still,  fail  to 
comply with the standards set by the audit profession. 
If users of financial statements and the general public were educated to think that the auditor's role embraces 
the detection and prevention of fraud, especially in relation to material items, the fraud and error detection 
role of  an audit  could be relatively objective.  However,  absolute objectivity cannot  be guaranteed since 
“materiality” and “material significance” are subjective concepts which require further clarification by the 
Auditing Practices Board. A return to the primary role of detection and prevention would also be welcomed 
since there are at present, not sufficient measures to hold the auditor liable for negative consequences of his 
actions. Some sources of academic literature assume  that the meaning of an audit is not objective/fixed  7 
whilst  other sources such as contents of  audit  reports assume that the meaning of an audit  is fixed.8 In 
relation to the latter assumption, there is the belief that the expectations gap could be significantly reduced – 
if not possible to eliminate.9 
The  remaining  sections  of  this  article  are  organised  as  follows  :  The  first  section  deals  with  different 
meanings attributed to the expectations gap. It  also considers why a stable meaning should be adopted. 
Section  two  then  considers  components  of  the  expectations  gap  and  possibilities  of  eliminating  these 
components. Section three discusses the historical background of  the expectations gap – including two very 
important cases which have been foundations of certain auditing standards. .Section four through an analysis 
and assessment of various standards, considers how clear ,unambiguous  standards could help reduce the 
expectations gap. The fifth section of this article then examines the social framework of the audit  before a 
conclusion is arrived at.
B)   DEFINITIONS   OF   THE   EXPECTATIONS   GAP
The issue revolving round the  expectations gap debate relates to the different and inconsistent meanings 
attributed to the definition of an audit by users of financial statements, the public and the audit profession. 
The “expectations gap” is the difference between what the public and users of financial statements perceive 
the role of an audit to be and what the audit profession claim is expected of them during the conduct of an 
audit. As mentioned in the introduction, this definition is preferred as  it is important to distinguish between 
the audit profession's expectations of an audit on the one hand, and the auditor's perception of an audit on the 
other hand. 
7  These include questionnaires, opinion surveys; see  P.Sikka A Puxty, H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility 
of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some Theory and Evidence”  December 2003  at p 1
8  ibid
9  ibid
According to Pierce and Kilcommins10 , the audit expectations gap is when external auditors' understanding 
of their role and duties is compared against the expectations of user groups and the general public. Liggio11 
defined  the  audit  expectations  gap  as  the  difference  between  the  levels  of  expected  performance  as 
interpreted by the independent accountant and the user of financial statements. These definitions use external 
auditors as their bench mark rather than the audit profession. The use of the audit profession as bench mark 
would provide a less subjective element and help narrow the expectations gap. In this sense it would be a 
preferred definition and would also provide a more stable element of the expectations gap – as the audit 
profession's  expectations  are  more well-defined than the  individual  auditor's  expectations.  Reference by 
Liggio to “users of financial statements” as opposed to members of the general public however, would give 
result to a narrowing of the expectations gap as it is obviously more feasible to educate users of financial 
information (via annual general meetings etc) than it is to educate members of the general public. 
The Cohen Commission in 1978 considered whether a gap might exist between what the public expected and 
what auditors could reasonably expect to accomplish.  As rightly stated by Porter12, many definitions  have 
failed  to mention the possibility of sub-standard performance by auditors. Even though Porter highlights the 
importance of considering  the full extent  of the audit expectations gap which can be done by comparing 
society's expectations of auditors against the perceived performance of auditors , easier comparison can be 
achieved through an analysis of the more objective components of the expectations gap.
The subjective components of the expectations gap could be made  “more objective” by considering and 
analysing each component and considering measures which could be taken to reduce the expectations gap 
created by  each of these components. Unreasonable expectations from the public could be transformed to 
reasonable expectations of users of financial statements since it is more feasible to educate users of financial 
information and since not all members of the public use financial information.  After measures have been 
taken to reduce components of the expectations gap, a comparison of the reasonable expectations of users of 
financial statements against what the audit profession expect can then be made. This would provide  for a 
more objective and stable analysis of the expectations gap.
C)    COMPONENTS   OF   THE    EXPECTATIONS   GAP
 Some commentators have attributed the expectations gap to users' confusion, widespread  misunderstanding, 
ignorance  and  /or  lack  of  education.13   Porter  analyses  the  total  expectations  gap  into  three  separate 
components14 namely  sub-standard  performance  (16%)  ,  deficient  standards  (50%)  and   unreasonable 
expectations (34%). Due to the fact that deficient standards can easily be revised and it is therefore relatively 
easier to reduce this component of the expectations gap, the deficient standards component can be considered 
the most objective component whilst unreasonable expectations and sub-standard performance are the more 
subjective  components.  Even  though  unreasonable  expectations  are  subjective,  it  still  constitutes  a 
significant proportion of the expectations gap and cannot be ignored. 
Sub standard performance should also not be ignored even though it constitutes just 16% of the expectations 
gap .  After all possible measures have been taken to reduce this component it could be ignored. The sub 
standard performance element is a problem arising from individual auditors, deficient standards stemming 
from the audit  profession whilst  unreasonable expectations emanate from the public.  An analysis  of  the 
individual components of the expectations gap this way helps to know and understand better how to deal 
with and reduce these problems creating the expectations gap. In particular, it provides knowledge as to 
where more efforts should be concentrated namely, the reforms of auditing standards (since this constitutes 
10 B Pierce and M Kilcommins  ' The Audit Expectations Gap : The Role of Auditing Education'  Dublin City  
University Business School Research Papers 1995-1996  No 13
11 C D Liggio 'The  Expectation Gap : The Accountant's  Waterloo' ( 1974 ) Journal of Contemporary Business 
Volume 3 No 3  at p 27
12 B Porter    ' An Empirical Study of the  Audit  Expectation – Performance  Gap' (1993) Accounting and Business  
Research Vol 24 no 93  p 50
13 P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003  at p  2
14 B Porter    ' An Empirical Study of the  Audit  Expectation – Performance  Gap' (1993) Accounting and Business  
Research Vol 24 no 93  p 50
half the problem). 
The expectations gap is an  issue for auditors as a greater “expectations gap” would lead to lower credibility, 
earning potential and prestige associated with their work.15  It is also an issue for the public and investors in 
particular  since  wealth  creation  and  political  stability  in  a  capitalist  economy depends  significantly  on 
confidence  and  accountability  and  external  audit  is  supposed   to  provide  such  confidence  and 
accountability.16 
Is it Possible to Eliminate the Expectations Gap?
According  to  Sikka  et  al,  the  nature  of  the  components  of  the  expectations  gap  make  it  difficult  to 
eliminate17.  Perceived performance of auditors is an element which is difficult  to measure and  changes 
constantly. It is however  possible to substantially reduce but not totally eliminate.
A number of suggestions have been put forward as a  means of narrowing the expectations gap. These 
include an expanded audit report which offers scope to inform users of what auditors actually do; broadening 
the role and responsibility of auditors in the areas of  fraud, illegal acts  and strengthening the perceived 
independence of auditors.18  The implementation of auditing education has been suggested as a means  of 
reducing the expectations gap.19  Audit education would surely help reduce the expectations gap but would 
not on its own be sufficient to solve the problem of all components of the expectations gap . Audit education 
would partly solve the problem of unreasonable expectations but not address deficient standards and sub-
standard  performance.  Porter  adds  that  in  order  for  audit  education  to  be  effective,  society  should  be 
educated on duties which may reasonably be expected of auditors.20
The MacDonald Commission expressed their opinion that audit education was unlikely to be effective in 
reducing  the  gap  since  it  concluded  that  for  the  most  part,  public  expectations  were  reasonable  and 
achievable.21 Sikka et  al  also  argue  that  he  expectations  gap  can  be  addressed  by  the  audit  profession 
widening  the  responsibilities  of  auditors.22  Even  if  new  standards  were  implemented,  the  issue  of 
enforcement is another matter which needs to be addressed. As a result,  enforcement and audit  liability 
measures are also required. 
Elements of the user misunderstanding gap investigated in the study by  Pierce and Kilcommins include (i) 
Duties  ;  (ii)  Ethical  and  legislative  framework  (iii)  Liability  (iv)  Audit  report.   The  duties'  component 
consists of fraud and error and many commentators have found the expectations gap to be widest in relation 
to detection and  reporting of fraud.23  The second element , the ethical and legislative framework included 
issues  such as   auditor  independence,  auditor  appointment  and audit  regulation.24 In  relation  to  auditor 
liability,  Gloeck and de Jager 25 argue that the Caparo case added a liability gap to the expectations gap since 
the public does not know to whom the auditor is liable.
However,  it  could also be  argued that  the  substandard performance component  of  the expectations  gap 
15 P Sikka, A Puxty H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some Theory 
and Evidence”  December 2003  at pg 1
16 ibid
17 See  P Sikka A Puxty H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003. Sikka et al argue that due to social conflict the meaning of social practices 
continually face challenges  and the gap between competing meanings of audit cannot be eliminated.
18 See  B Pierce and M Kilcommins  ' The Audit Expectations Gap : The Role of Auditing Education'  Dublin City  
University Business School Research Papers 1995-1996  No 13 at p 3
19 ibid
20 ibid
21 ibid
22 P Sikka A Puxty H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some Theory 
and Evidence”  December 2003
23 See  B Pierce and M Kilcommins  ' The Audit Expectations Gap : The Role of Auditing Education'  Dublin City  
University Business School Research Papers 1995-1996  No 13 at p 5
24 ibid
25 ( 1993) ; see  B.Pierce and M. Kilcommins  ' The Audit Expectations Gap : The Role of Auditing Education'  Dublin 
City University Business School Research Papers 1995-1996  No 13 at p 6
already  embraces  the  liability  gap  as  auditors  are  encouraged  to  under  perform in  the  absence  of  any 
statutory duty of care to third party stakeholders – especially since no economic incentives exist for them to 
owe a duty of care to such stakeholders.
D)         HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND  OF   THE  EXPECTATIONS  GAP
The origins of  auditing date back to  Greek,  Egyptian and earlier  civilisations  and whilst  there  was the 
emergence of large manufacturing organisations in the eighteenth century, the usual association between 
audits  and  fraud  detection  remained.  26 Towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  more  prominent 
accountancy profession associated audits with fraud detection even though there was opposition by  those 
who argued that it was unreasonable to expect the auditor to expose fraudulent acts.27 Lawrence Dicksee's 
text-book is  often considered to be the first  major auditing text-book and his original  book which was 
published in  1892,28 stated clearly  that  the  scope of an audit  included namely :  the  detection of  fraud, 
technical errors and errors of principle.29 He also stated that the detection of fraud was a most important 
portion of the auditor's duties and that the whole duty of the auditor was to ascertain the exact state of the 
client's affairs on a certain date.30  However , other authors such as Robertson and Montgomery argued  on 
the contrary and considered the detection of fraud to be a secondary audit objective.31
Humphrey et al noted that the position adopted by the profession in Britain during the twentieth century 
played down any suggestion that auditors had responsibility linked to fraud apart from that which arose from 
the  need  to  confirm  the  truth  and  fairness  of  financial  statements.32 Chandler  et  al33 reviewed   the 
development of audit objectives between 1840 and 1940 and concluded that the primary objective in relation 
to public companies between 1830 and 1860 was the verification of financial statements and that more 
emphasis was put on fraud detection in the late nineteenth century.34 They also added that the primary audit 
objective  reverted  back  to  financial  statements  verification  in  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth  century.35 
However, according to some,  in the early part of the twentieth century, fraud detection continued to be 
regarded as a major audit objective.36 
According  to  Brown,37  the  confusion  over  audit  objectives  was  finally  resolved  after  1940  and  fraud 
detection was generally accepted to be a secondary objective. However, the objectives of auditing have not 
been adjusted to conform with operational processes of auditing.38 For example, selective sampling would 
have corresponded to a primary objective of financial statements verification whilst 100% testing would 
correspond with the detection of fraud.39
One important difference between mid-to-late Victorian England and more recent times is the presence or 
lack of presence of audit expectations.40  Victorian England is seen as a  time of evolution and formulation of 
26 See  P Sikka A Puxty H  Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003 at p 9
27 See  P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003  p 11
28 L Dicksee 'Auditing : A Practical Manual for  Auditors'  (1892) 
29 L Dicksee 'Auditing : A Practical Manual for  Auditors'  (1892)   p 6
30 Ibid  p 6
31 See  P Sikka A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003 at p 12
32 See C Humphrey  P Moizer  and  S Turley  ' Protection Against Detection : The Case of Auditors and Fraud' 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 6 No 1 p 55  
33 R A Chandler  J R Edwards and M Anderson 'Changing Perceptions of the Role of the Company Auditor : 1840 – 
1940' Accounting and Business Research  Vol 23 Autumn 1993 pp 443-459
34 ibid
35 ibid
36 See  P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003  p 13
37  See  R E  Brown   “ Changing Audit  Objectives and Techniques” ,  The Accounting Review 37  pp 696 – 703 
(1962)
38 M Power “The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification”  p 21
39 ibid
40 T Eu-Jin and P Cobbin  ' A  Re Visitation  of the 'Audit Expectations Gap' : Judicial and Practitioner Views on the 
Role of the Auditor in late- Victorian England'  2005 
expectations  and whilst gaps existed in the nineteenth century, they were mainly to do with inconsistencies 
and not  expectations.41  The  differing inconsistent  expectations  between the  judiciary and the  auditing 
profession is illustrated in the landmark cases of  London and General Bank (No 2) [1895] and Kingston 
Cotton Mill (No 2)  [1896] in which the UK Court of Appeal delivered two significant judgements.
London and General Bank (No2)[1895]  
This case concerned  the adequacy of security on bank loans ,  whether shareholders had been deceived as to 
the condition of the company, whether dividends had been paid out of capital and not available profits. The 
first instance decision  had  been against the defendants ( the auditor). However in the Appeal Court, Lindley 
LJ overturned the previous court's decision and his opinion on the auditor's duty is as follows :42  '.......the 
duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry and although an  auditor might infer from 
an unusual statement that something was seriously wrong, it by no means followed that ordinary people 
would have their suspicions aroused.'  Lindley LJ also stated  that  it was not the auditor's duty to guarantee 
the books showing the true position of the company's affairs or to guarantee that the balance-sheet was 
accurate.
Kingston Cotton Mill ( No 2) [ 1895]
The first instance decision  was one which involved the auditor relying on managers' certificates without the 
auditor conducting  a physical observation of the inventory or taking steps to confirm valuation. In that 
decision, Vaughan Williams J found that the auditors and directors were liable for dividends paid from non-
existent profits. However damages sought against them in respect of consequent insolvency on the basis of 
tort was denied. There was a lot of concern by the audit profession following this decision and the validity of 
managers' certificates was also called into question. However Lopes LJ in the Appeal Court overturned the 
decision in his famous judgement :
– It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care and caution 
which a reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and 
caution must depend on the particular  circumstances of  each case. An auditor  is not  bound to be a 
detective or as was said to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is 
something wrong. He is a watchdog but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of 
the company in whom confidence is placed by the company -43 
These two cases were the foundations of certain auditing standards which focussed on the accepted fraud and 
error objectives and placed the nature of the audit  on centre stage.44 Apart from establishing that the auditor 
was not expected to fish out every fraud it established the use reasonable care and skill in his handling of 
relevant books and records.45 However, the fact that London and General Bank ( No 2) [1895]46 and Kingston 
Cotton Mill (No 2) [1896] confirmed  the “reasonableness” test  did not completely remove any concern 
created due to the subjective nature of the reasonableness test.47
During the early years of the twentieth century, fraud detection as an audit objective came to be replaced by 
the objective of checking that the appropriate accounting standards had been adopted and correctly used in 
constructing financial statements.48  Between 1940 and 1970, fraud detection seemed to be regarded as a 
secondary audit objective even though this move had not been approved by the Companies Acts of 1948 and 
41 ibid
42 See pp  682 -685
43  See pp288 - 289
44 T Eu-Jin and P Cobbin  ' A  Re Visitation  of the 'Audit Expectations Gap' : Judicial and Practitioner Views on the 
Role of the Auditor in late- Victorian England'  2005 
45 Ibid 
46 Pp  682 - 683
47 T Eu-Jin and P Cobbin  ' A  Re Visitation  of the 'Audit Expectations Gap' : Judicial and Practitioner Views on the 
Role of the Auditor in late- Victorian England'  2005 
48  See  P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003p 13
1967. 
 The re-emergence of fraud detection as an audit objective occurred during the Thatcher administration and 
was also strongly highlighted during the mid- 1970s property and secondary banking crisis.49  In 1985, a 
working party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) was established to 
consider the matter relating to auditors' responsibilities in relation to fraud.50  This was prompted as a result 
of criticisms about the audit function following the collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers.51 The collapse of 
Johnson Matthey Bankers in 1984 also brought about  questions on regulation of financial markets and the 
government being unhappy with the role of auditors, wanted to impose upon auditors a duty to report fraud 
to the Bank of England even without the knowledge of the client organisation.52 In response to this, the 
Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  England  and  Wales  argued  against  Lord  Justice  Bingham's 
recommendations  for  an  imposition  of  statutory  duty.  The  working  party  of  the  Institute  of  Chartered 
Accountants  in  England  and  Wales  suggested  instead  that  companies  should  be  required  by  statute  to 
maintain  adequate  systems  of  internal  control.53 Problems  which  could  threaten  the  auditor  client 
relationship,  duty  of  confidentiality  were  mentioned  and  these  issues  though  apparent  seemed  more 
important than the protection of the public's interests.
It took another three years for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales to issue draft 
guidance on the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud and other irregularities.54 This document was 
amended further and published as a full operational guideline in February 1990.55 Management responsibility 
for setting-up adequate systems of internal controls is highlighted but auditors are reminded to plan the audit 
to  provide  a   “reasonable  expectation”  of  detecting  material  misstatements.56 “Materiality”  has  been 
interpreted in professional guidance as the degree of tolerable or acceptable error in financial statements but 
like  the  term  “reasonable  expectation”  it  is  not  specified  beyond  this.57 It  is  important  that  further 
clarification in relation to these terms are provided as the question to whether auditors have a responsibility 
to detect fraud depends on the interpretation of these terms.58 The guidance document does not deny the 
auditor's duty to detect fraud – however, it qualifies this duty by the “reasonable expectation” term.59
E)   THE  ROLE  OF  AUDITING STANDARDS  IN  REDUCING  THE EXPECTATIONS  GAP
Concept  of  Materiality 
The International  Standard on Auditing (  ISA UK and Ireland )  320 establishes  standards  and provides 
guidance on the concept of materiality and how this relates to audit risk.60 The concept of “materiality” is 
defined in the International Accounting Standards Board's “Framework for the Preparation and Presentation 
of Financial Statements” as follows  :
-  Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users 
taken on the basis of the financial statements. Materiality depends on the size of the item or error judged in 
the particular circumstances of its omission or misstatement. Thus, materiality provides a threshold or cut-off 
point rather than being a primary qualitative characteristic which information must have if it is to be useful -
The problem with this definition revolves round the word “judged”. The assessment of materiality is based 
on professional judgement.61  
49 See  P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003 p 14
50 M .Power  'The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification' at p 23
51 M Power  'The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification' at p 23
52 See  P Sikka  A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003 16
53 M Power  'The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification' at p 23
54 M Power  'The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification' at p 23
55 ibid
56 ibid
57 ibid
58 M Power  'The Audit Society : Rituals of Verification' at p 23
59 ibid
60 See <http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
61 ISA (UK and Ireland) 320 . 4
In  planning  the  audit,  the  auditor  establishes  an  acceptable  level  of  materiality  in  order  to  detect 
quantitatively material misstatements.62 In addition, both the amount ( quantity ) and nature (quality ) of 
misstatements need to be considered.63
The auditor also needs to consider the possibility of misstatements of relatively small amounts which could 
cummulatively have a material effect on the financial statements.64 An error could be potentially material if it 
is  repeated  each  month  for  a  particular  month  end  procedure.65 Materiality  at  both  the  entire  financial 
statement level and in relation to classes of transactions, account balances and disclosures also need to be 
considered.66 Legal and regulatory requirements may also affect materiality.67
From the above definition and standard, it can be seen that a lot of subjective issues affect the concept of 
materiality. Legal and regulatory issues which may affect materiality need to be more clearly defined and an 
error estimate given by the Auditing Practices Board, the APB. A lot of matters left to be judged by the 
individual auditor should be also be determined  by the APB and clearly set out in the standards.
“Material significance” is defined  by ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 Section B : 'A matter or group of matters is 
normally of material significance to a regulator's function when, due either to its nature or its potential 
financial impact, it is likely of itself to require investigation by the regulator.'68
Whilst judgement is also required by the auditor in determining whether a matter is  or likely to be of 
material significance, material significance does not have the same meaning as materiality in the context of 
financial audit.69 A particular event which may have little impact on the financial statements of an entity may 
be of a nature or type that is likely to change the perception of the regulator.70
ISA ( UK and Ireland ) 240 : The  Auditor's  Responsibility  to  Consider  Fraud  in  an  Audit  of  Financial 
Statements
In carrying out the above function, the auditor is expected to maintain a sceptic attitude throughout the audit 
despite his past experience with the entity about the honesty and integrity of management.71 The auditor also 
considers reports from the deposit taker's compliance department, legal department and money laundering 
reporting officer with reviews undertaken by third parties such as reports prepared under section 166 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.72
F)                   EXAMINING  THE  SOCIAL  FRAMEWORK   OF   THE   AUDIT
Sikka et al have argued that meanings of the audit are determined by particular social arrangements which 
are always subject to change and as a result it is difficult for the audit to have a fixed meaning.73 Even though 
social  and  global  changes  have  shaped  the  role  of  the  auditor  and  hence  the  role  of  an  audit,  some 
components  within the  definition of  an audit  can be fixed.   The advent  of  technology,  internal  control 
systems have definitely transformed the environment within which an audit  operates.  Periodical surveys 
should be carried out in the general public to ascertain what many perceive to be the role of an auditor. These 
surveys should be carried out only after the public has been sufficiently educated about the role of the audit. 
62 ISA (UK and Ireland ) 320 . 5
63 ibid
64 ISA (UK and Ireland) 320.6
65 ibid
66 ISA ( UK and Ireland) 320 . 7
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68 See  <http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
69 ISA ( UK and Ireland ) 250 paragraph 62 
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73 See P Sikka A Puxty  H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap : Some 
Theory and Evidence”  December 2003 at  p 5
After this, draft proposals should be made whereby public is still involved and  is invited to submit their 
ideas  or  challenge any proposals.   The draft  proposals  on the  definition of  an  audit  should be  a  more 
acceptable definition by popular consensus – as realised through the opinions received from surveys carried 
out on the public. There should be a relatively objective component within the definition of an audit which 
would be the public's reasonable expectations. These expectations could be deemed reasonable as  public 
would already have been educated about the role of auditors, nature of audits before a survey is carried out to 
find out what the public want from an audit.
The subjective component definition of an audit would be revised from time to time – depending in the 
social , environmental changes. The objective component would also be revised from time to time based on 
periodical surveys. In the absence of an imposition of statutory duty on auditors, the fraud and error detection 
role of an auditor  seems to be a role which should become a  primary audit objective – as this would help 
bring about some form of accountability. Of course, the auditor cannot be expected to sniff out every form of 
fraud – only material ones. The cases of Enron and Parmalat certainly involved huge amounts of money 
which are deemed significant and material from a subjective or an objective point of view. Why were the 
auditors involved not able to detect such material amounts?  The re instatement of  fraud detection (and also 
error detection) as a primary audit objective which constitutes a relatively fixed component definition of an 
audit (as the public has every right to expect this duty from the auditor – provided issues relate to material 
fraud) would certainly help bring some form of accountability within the audit profession.
CONCLUSION
 The Fraud and Error Detection Role of an Audit
The meaning attributed by users of financial statements as regarding the definition of an audit cannot be 
fixed  but  elements  within  the  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  audit  can  –  to  a  relative  extent.  Such 
components within the definition of an audit include the fraud and error role.  In the absence of a statutory 
duty of care owed by auditors to third party stakeholders, this role of fraud and error detection is one which 
is encouraged and if the public (and more specifically, users of financial statements) were educated about 
this role, it would be deemed to be a reasonable expectation. Questionnaires should be given out and surveys 
conducted frequently to ensure that this role is one which is perceived by the greater part of users of financial 
information as that which constitutes  the role of the auditor.
Users of  financial information should also be made aware that  the fraud and error role is  applicable to 
material misstatements. The role of the auditor in verifying financial statements and providing an opinion in 
relation to those statements is one which relies on too much judgment,  is too subjective and creates greater 
possibilities of widening the expectations gap.
In concluding this chapter, various ways through which the individual components of the expectations gap 
could be reduced are addressed :
The Sub Standard Performance Component 
Bringing back the fraud and detection role should help reduce this component.  Prem Sikka adds that the 
threat of a punitive action by the DTI could create economic incentives for accounting firms to reflect on the 
consequences of their actions – as a reduction in their revenue, due to fines incurred, would make them think 
twice before indulging in acts with negative consequences.  In contrast, Huepkes 74  argues that the threat of 
litigation could lead to further concentration in the auditing industry and also increase the trend towards 
defensive auditing – whereby audit  partners tend to interprete rules prescriptively rather than exercising 
subjective judgment. 
Deficient Standards Component
74 See  EHG Huepkes “ The External Auditor and the bank Supervisor : “ Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?” 
Journal of Banking Regulation, Volume 7 No 1 / 2 2005 at p 10
Unambiguous wordings within accounting standards should be avoided and clearer definitions provided to 
give  the  auditor  a  better  understanding about  his  duties.Post-  Enron reforms which led to  the  Auditing 
Practices Board being responsible for setting standards on objectivity, integrity and independence should 
improve the standard setting process and provide more consistency to the way standards are interpreted.  
The  year  2005 was  a  year  of  major  change for  many companies  with the  introduction of  international 
accounting standards and new auditing standards.75 Public concerns about the continuing relevance of the 
“true and fair view” have been highlighted especially with the advent of the introduction of international 
standards on accounting and auditing in the UK.76 Responding to this, the FRC published a report in August 
2005 in which it concluded that the “true and fair view” continues to remain a cornerstone in the UK system 
of financial reporting.77
Unreasonable Expectations
Reasonable expectations of the public could be ascertained through education of the public about the role of 
the auditor and the auditing standards relating to his role. Public education about the auditor's role could be 
facilitated through annual shareholders' meetings and other events which are organised for the purposes of 
educating users of financial information. As mentioned numerous times in this chapter, it would be more 
feasible to educate users of financial information as opposed to members of the general public – especially 
since not all members of the public use financial information.
Humphrey78 describes the issue of auditor independence as “going to the heart of the audit expectations 
debate.”79  The  reality  and  notion  of  auditor  independence  is  vital  to  public  confidence  in  financial 
reporting.80 Public confidence in financial markets and the conduct of public interest entities relies partly on 
the credibility of the opinions and reports given by auditors in relation with financial audits.81 It  could be 
inferred that this issue of auditor independence relates to the role of the auditor and that factors  which could 
prevent  the  auditor  from performing  his  expected  role  –  hence  compromising  his  independence,  could 
definitely increase the expectations gap. This is not surprising as any misconception of ( by the public or 
users of financial information) or diversion from the auditor's expected role ( by the auditor) contributes to 
increasing  the  expectations  gap.   As  a  result  of  the  additional  role  of  auditors  and  reporting 
accountants/skilled  persons  of  financial  services  firms  in  reporting  to  supervisors  under  the  Financial 
Services  and  Markets  Act  2000  and  under  prior  legislation,  there  is  greater  possibility  for  further 
misunderstandings – thus increasing the expectations gap further.82 However, arguments have been made in 
favour of the dual nature of the auditor. Interviewees from firms have seen little conflict between the dual 
role of auditors and reporting accountants/skilled persons viewing the issue from a cost benefit analysis.83
75 See FRC Annual Report 2005/ 2006
76 See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006 at p 6
77 ibid
78  C Humphrey Debating Audit Expectations chapter 2 in M Sherer and S Turley (eds) Current Issues in Auditing 
( Third Edition) 1997, Paul Chapman , London
79   P Dewing and P O Russell The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK Financial  
Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 3
80   D  Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at  pg 18
81 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  4 
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Services Supervision  Institute  of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  (2005) 3
83  Ibid p 100
Measures have been adopted by the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest. Chapter 5 
of the FSA Supervision Manual provides examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. 
The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it is cost 
effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the matter to be 
reported on. There are also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled persons.84
 Sufficient measures are in place to protect the auditor's independence85 – hence no threat of widening the 
expectations gap. However more work is needed to ensure that the role of the auditor is better defined and 
that the possibility of unwarranted liabilites and risks are avoided.
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